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     Enter TIME 
The Winter’s Tale, Aristotle and Derrida 
 
 
 
This tragedy of dating has become apparent to me today, too late. 
– Jacques Derrida 
 
 
After some twenty years of meditating on time, time itself at last takes the stage in 
Shakespeare’s work.  Time has arrived.  At the beginning of Act Four of The Winter’s Tale, 
time enters and speaks: 
 
Enter TIME, the Chorus. 
I that please some, try all; both joy and terror 
Of good and bad; that makes and unfolds error 
Now take upon me in the name of Time 
To use my wings.  Impute it not a crime 
To me or my swift passage that I slide 
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O’er sixteen years and leave the growth untried 
Of that wide gap, since it is in my power 
To o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour 
To plant and ‘o’erwhelm custom. 
 
Beyond the familiar appearance of Father Time on the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century stage to account for the ‘swift passage’ of time, it is hard to underestimate how 
strange this arrival is.  Imagine that it was not TIME that entered at the beginning of Act Four 
of The Winter’s Tale, but space.  Enter SPACE.  How do we keep watching, how do we keep 
reading after the arrival of TIME?  What was happening before the arrival of time?  
Since at least Aristotle, the arrival of time itself has been the philosopher’s dream, the 
disquieting, long hoped for and always dreaded moment of arrival.  But can time ever arrive?  
Can time itself arrive?  We are no longer waiting, look Godot has arrived, he is here!  Enter 
TIME.   
The arrival of TIME in The Winter’s Tale can be taken as a wonderful conceit, an 
impossible gathering, an amazing act of theatrical bravado.  It is also possible that 
Shakespeare was sensitive to the entrance of this most difficult, most elusive of characters.  
As he writes, TIME enters and announces a ‘wide gap’, a gap that can neither simply be 
filled, nor entirely closed.  The Winter’s Tale perhaps marks the extraordinary entrance of 
that which cannot arrive – as itself. 
The reaction against this ‘wide gap’ was so great in the eighteenth century that when 
David Garrick and Charles Marsh both adapted and reworked The Winter’s Tale in 1756, 
they closed the gap and removed TIME from the stage.  But there was some criticism of this 
heavy-handed intervention.  In a review of Garrick’s work, Theophilus Cibber complained 
that Shakespeare’s play had been ‘lop’d, hack’d, and dock’d’.  In trying to close ‘the wide 
gap’ of The Winter’s Tale, Garrick had only opened more gaps. 
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This anxiety in 1756 about the wide gaps of time on the stage may have also been a 
remote and rippling eddy from the great ‘wide gap’ that had appeared four years earlier in 
1752 when Britain and its colonies had finally adopted the Gregorian calendar: ‘that calendar 
trick where chance will have marked an epoch’.  In an attempt to resolve the long-standing 
problems that had arisen from trying to ensure that Easter would never coincided with 
Passover, in 1582 a Papal Bull had introduced the Gregorian calendar in Catholic Europe.  
For the next 170 years every correspondent to and from Britain would have problems with 
dating, and every traveller to and from Britain would experience an exceptional time lag.   
Until 1752, the new year began in Britain not on 1 January but on 25 March: the dating of 
the previous year and the year to come were always nearly three months out of sequence with 
much of Europe.  On 24 March 1751 in Paris it was still 1750 in London.  There was also a 
discrepancy of eleven days between the Julian and Gregorian Calendars, and for 170 years if 
you sailed from France to England you could arrive ten days before you had left.  This 
remarkable ‘wide gap’ of time – that led to the traveller arriving before departing, and 
suggested that the entrance of time could disorder the accustomed sequence of ‘before’ and 
‘after’ and ‘behind’ and ‘in front’ – began in 1582 when William Shakespeare was eighteen 
years old. 
Though it has recently been argued that there were probably no riots (as has often been 
thought) when the eleven days were removed and the calendar jumped from Wednesday 2 
September to Thursday 14 September 1752, as with Garrick and Marsh’s adaptations of The 
Winter’s Tale four years later, it was apparent that one could only close a gap of time by 
opening another ‘wide gap’.  One can only wonder what happened to those in Britain and its 
colonies who had a birthday or an anniversary of some kind between 3 September and 13 
September 1752. 
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In fact, this extraordinary ‘wide gap’ in September 1752 is remarkably elusive.  The Earl 
of Chesterfield, who first proposed changing the calendar in 1751, is rather coy in his letters 
to his son leaving a gap in the correspondence from 21 July 1752 to 15 September 1752, the 
second day of the new calendar.  Samuel Johnson dates a letter to Charlotte Lennox from 
February of that year as 1751/2, hinting at the confusion of dating the New Year from 1 
January.  It is only to be regretted that the antiquarian Joseph Ames, who noted with such 
care that on ‘Friday evening 21st day August 1752 at Eleven a Clock’ he was ‘accompanied 
by Mr. John Rook to the Angell Inn [at] the back of St. Clemons church in the Strand’, leaves 
a gap in his travel diary from Sunday 23 August to Saturday 18 October 1752. 
Throughout the eighteenth century it was generally believed that the sixteen-year gap 
announced by TIME at the beginning of Act Four of The Winter’s Tale contravened the so-
called Aristotelian unities of action, time and place.  Charles Gildon, writing in 1710, was 
one of the first critics to insist that the entrance of time in The Winter’s Tale could only be 
read as an apology: 
 
Natural Reason indeed show’d to Shakespeare the Absurdity of Making the 
Representation longer than the Time, and the Place more extensive than the Place 
of acting, as is plain from his Choruses in his Historical Plays, in which he 
apologises for the Absurdity, as in the Beginning of the fourth Act of The 
Winter’s Tale among other things’. 
 
Despite what Gildon says of the history plays, there seems to be little apology when 
RUMOUR enters triumphantly at the beginning of The Second Part of Henry the Fourth. 
When CHORUS twice asks for the audience’s ‘pardon’ in the opening of The Life of Henry 
the Fifth it is perhaps more to celebrate the fact that the ‘vast fields of France’ can fit ‘within 
this wooden O’. 
 5 
While the critical response to Shakespeare has long since moved on from measuring his 
strict adherence to the so-called Aristotelian unities, it is worth recalling that in the eighteenth 
century it was widely believed that Shakespeare introduced TIME in The Winter’s Tale to 
apologise to Aristotle.  Constrained by his source material, Robert Greene’s Pandosto, 
Shakespeare brings time on stage to apologise to all those readers of Aristotle in his audience 
and, ultimately, to the great philosopher himself.  Of course, one problem with this 
interpretation is that Shakespeare apologises and still breaks all the rules.  At least one critic 
in the eighteenth century described the appearance of time as an apology but added, ‘in the 
Days of our great Poet the Unities of the Drama were very little understood’.  Shakespeare 
was apologising, but he didn’t even know what he was apologising for. 
If the entrance and ‘wide gap’ of time was almost uniformly condemned in the eighteenth 
century, from the 1950s it has been celebrated by critics as ‘a breathing space’, as an ‘orderly 
and spacious’ division, a graceful changing of tone, a shift from death to life, a move from 
tragedy to comedy: in other words, a perfect hinge that separates the play in two symmetrical 
halves.  In the second half of the twentieth century the entrance of time became a scene of 
order, of decorous transition, of symmetry and structure.  In short, it is only in the twentieth 
century that TIME becomes a genuinely eighteenth century concept.   
More recently, the entrance of TIME has also been linked to ‘a time that lacks any sense 
of causality, development, fullness, or even duration’.  Rather than linger in this dreamtime, 
this time without time, or set our watches to the Zeitalter der Aufklärung, it is perhaps worth 
holding on to the eighteenth century preoccupation with Shakespeare as a negligent reader of 
Aristotle.  And if we question the predominant eighteenth century assumption that 
Shakespeare is apologising to the Aristotelians, what is Shakespeare trying to say when he 
addresses Aristotle? 
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If, as Virginia Woolf had wished in Orlando, we could imagine Shakespeare as ‘a rather 
fat, rather shabby man … sitting at the servant’s table [in a country house] with a tankard 
beside him and paper in front of him’, we could also imagine him wandering into the library 
of the country house and picking up a copy of Aristotle’s Poetics.  We could imagine him 
objecting from the start to Aristotle’s insistence that ‘it is not appropriate in a female 
character to be manly, or clever’ (1454a).  And if he had taken Aristotle’s judgement that the 
worst kind of play ‘is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the 
deed, and leaves it undone’, there would have been no Hamlet (1453b).  If Shakespeare was a 
reader of Aristotle, he evidently decided not to follow the august and narrow guidelines of the 
Poetics. 
When Shakespeare does address Greek philosophy, when he depicts a Greek philosopher 
in The Life of Timon of Athens, he describes Apemantus as a ‘churlish philosopher’.  The 
world churlish has a very particular history in English.  Prior to the Norman Conquest, a 
churl was a member of the lowest rank of freemen, but after 1066 a churl became a serf or 
bondsman.  This traumatic fall in status developed into a more general sense of churlish as 
being of low birth (a peasant, a rustic), and eventually to acting as if one were of low birth.  
Whatever one’s position in society, one could be described as acting churlish, as being surly, 
boorish, rude or ill bred.  A ‘churlish philosopher’ is then a philosopher who performs, who 
acts as if they were of low birth: the philosopher as an actor.   
 
First Lord: What time o’day is’t, Apemantus? 
Apemantus: Time to be honest.  
First Lord: That time serves still. 
Apemantus: The most accursèd thou, that still omitt’st it. 
 
 7 
When Apemantus the philosopher-actor laments that the time is not honest, he is not that far 
from that other actor-philosopher, Hamlet.  Apemantus the philosopher charges that the time 
is dishonest, and that one can only reply to the particular question ‘What time is it?’, by 
answering with the general observation, the time is dishonest – Hamlet does much the same 
with women.  Apemantus the actor, the churl-ish philosopher, the feigner of low birth, says 
that the time is dishonest.  It is perhaps not by chance that Apemantus says this just as he is 
about to go to a banquet that Alcibiades is attending.  Plato’s Symposium (or The Banquet, as 
it is called in French) opens with Socrates arriving late for the banquet with Alcibiades: the 
philosopher is always getting the time wrong. 
Shakespeare plays with Greek philosophy, he turns the philosopher into a player.  And 
whether or not Shakespeare read the Poetics, he did play with Aristotle.  In Act Two of 
Troilus and Cressida Hector says: 
 
Paris and Troilus, you have both said well, 
But on the cause and question now in hand 
Have glossed but superficially – not much 
Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought 
Unfit to hear moral philosophy. 
 
According to the editors of the Norton Shakespeare this is a reference to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.  While some have responded to the passage in Troilus and Cressida by 
raising the possibility that Shakespeare didn’t know that Aristotle came after Homer, others 
have used it as grounds for his acute reading of the Ethics.  Whether unintentionally or 
intentionally, in Troilus and Cressida Shakespeare treats Aristotle anachronistically: he 
confuses the proper order of the before and after. 
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As Nicholas Royle has shown, Shakespeare was preoccupied with anachronism, and the 
uncanniness of this anachronism is at the heart of Derrida’s readings of Shakespeare.  As the 
unities of action, time and place – which were only formulated in the 1570s by Castelvetro – 
the question of anachronism, of ‘how a text deals with its own datedness’, was also a recent 
innovation in Shakespeare’s lifetime.  Peter Burke has argued that the recognition of 
anachronism in the early modern period created a new ‘sense of historical perspective’. 
Anachronism, the problem of the date, of dating, becomes the origin of a new kind of 
historiography.  How does one respond to this heightened sense of dating, of confronting 
what it is out of date, of the strange relation between the before and the after?   
In Troilus and Cressida it appears that, like travellers to England after 1582, Aristotle 
arrives before he has departed.  Let’s imagine that Shakespeare knows what he is doing: he is 
making a joke, a very serious joke about time –– Aristotle before Homer.  He is playing with 
Aristotle, playing with Aristotelian time.  As Hamlet suggests, it all a question of looking 
before and after: 
 
What is a man 
If his chief good and market of his time 
Be but to sleep and feed? – a beast, no more. 
Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and god-like reason 
To fust in us unused. 
 
Looking before and after, we must first turn to Aristotle’s account of time in Book IV of 
the Physics.  Time, Aristotle argues, is ‘a kind of number’ (219b).  Number, if you think 
about it, is always one and has the capability to be more than one.  In other words, it is 
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always the same and always different, which is what makes it the same.  Time is at once 
‘continuous and divisible’ (220b).  Time is always a dividing continuity, and this is what 
constitutes its nature.  This is how Aristotle resolves the problem of the apparent non-
existence of time.  It could seem, Aristotle writes, that time ‘either does not exist at all or 
barely, and in an obscure way.  One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to 
be and is not yet.  Yet time … is made up of these’ (218a).  For Aristotle, it is because time is 
‘a kind of number’ that the past and the future, the before and the after, do not threaten the 
existence of time.   
‘We apprehend time’, Aristotle observes, ‘only when we have marked motion, marking it 
by before and after’ (219a).  For us, it seems there is only time when there is the movement of 
before and after.  The limitations of our perception of time could undermine the recognition 
that ‘time is present equally everywhere and with all things’ (218b).  There is always time, 
but there are gaps in our perception of time.  To get beyond this limited perspective, Aristotle 
accounts for the relation of movement to time through number. 
‘Time’, he argues, ‘is not motion, but number of motion’ (221b).  Number, as we have 
seen, is both the one and the more than one, a dividing continuity, and also accounts for what 
is counted, enumerated or measured.  Time is ‘what is counted’.  It is ‘number of motion in 
respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’ ’ (219b).  Number, Aristotle writes, as the dividing continuity 
that counts and measures motion (the movement of before and after), is the now.  One and 
more than one, always the same and always different, time is ‘both made continuous … and 
divided’ by the now (220a).  The now is divided into ‘one before and one after’, and accounts 
for the movement of before and after (219b).  Time, or the economy of the now as number, is 
the now as the movement of before and after.  For Aristotle, time becomes ‘what is bounded 
by the ‘now’ ’ (219a).  It is a kind of number, and the now is a kind of boundary.  ‘The 
‘now’’, he writes, ‘is the link of time … (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit 
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of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other)’ (222a).  The now divides 
and connects, terminates and unifies: it is ‘the boundary of the past and the future’ (223a). 
In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger argues that our traditional relationship to time as 
‘that which is counted’ and defined by ‘the use of clocks’, has its origins in Aristotle’s 
interpretation of time in the Physics.  By ‘following the positions’ of the hands or ‘pointer’ of 
a clock, Heidegger observes, one ‘counts’ time.  To count time, one always assumes that a 
‘travelling pointer’ is present.  For Heidegger, this positional accounting for time 
demonstrates that since Aristotle it has been accepted that ‘time is what shows itself in … a 
making-present’.  One counts time, one retains an earlier or before by ‘making it present’, 
and one awaits a later or after by ‘making it present’.  One always counts, accounts for and 
measures time from the now: the before is always the ‘now-no-longer’ and the after always 
the ‘now-not-yet’.  The before and after are always co-opted, put to work for ‘making 
present’.  This traditional ontological concept of time is founded on an assumption that 
begins with Aristotle, namely that time is defined by space.  The ‘travelling pointer’ that 
marks the position, the location and movement of the now … the now … and the now … is 
spatial. 
In Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida refers to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and his 
description of ‘a concept of time thought in terms of spatial movement or of the now’ as 
‘intrinsic to the totality of the history of the Occident’.  This is what the West does: it thinks 
time in terms of space and in terms of the now.  For Derrida, however, there is an important 
difference between thinking time in terms of space and thinking it in terms of the now.  In his 
own reading of Aristotle’s Physics, in the 1968 essay  ‘Ousia and Gramme’, Derrida 
emphasizes the differences between time as the now and time as presence.  If one takes the 
now simply as the essence of time, time appears to be incompatible with being.  As the no 
longer now (the before) and the not yet now (the after), the now ‘accommodates 
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nonbeingness’, and therefore, Derrida argues, ‘cannot participate in presence, in substance, in 
beingness itself (ousia)’.  Aristotle resolves this problem by arguing that time is a dividing 
continuity, or the now as presence. 
According to Derrida, time in the Physics is not just the now as presence (as Heidegger 
implies).  It is the now working for presence – and this makes all the difference.  Aristotle 
argues that the now as time can only be successive.  In other words, the now cannot endure 
two nows existing at the same time.  But this is what time as presence does (the now as the 
just before co-existing with the now as the soon after).  For Derrida, this highlights that the 
possibility of presence presupposes, relies on, a spatial difference. 
For Heidegger, time is inauthentic and fallen since Aristotle because it has been defined 
by and characterised as a kind of space.  For Derrida, on the contrary, this reliance of time on 
space suggests that time (as presence) needs spacing.  It also suggests that space (as 
presence) needs temporalization.  Working for presence, the now cannot avoid what Derrida 
calls différance.  The differing and the deferring of the rhythms and speeds of space 
becoming time and of time becoming space, différance becomes both the only possibility and 
the unavoidable ruin of time (and space) as presence, as being.  For Derrida, Western 
philosophy has always relied on the inadmissible inseparability of time and space.  In this 
instance, he questions Heidegger’s denigration of space.  In his earlier objections to 
structuralism, on the other hand, he challenged its privileging of space (as structure) to unify 
meaning and form at the expense of time.  This oscillating inseparability of time and space is 
Derrida’s great and disturbing contribution to philosophy. 
Differing and deferring time can never be itself, can never arrive as itself.  Enter TIME 
and we are always looking before and after.  It would be far too easy to think that 
Shakespeare with all his verbal brilliance somehow just throws off the Aristotelian 
inheritance, and that he could simply stand “outside” of the great ontological tradition of 
 12 
Western philosophy.  But we can perhaps ask if Shakespeare merely remains the other of 
Aristotle.   
For Hamlet, who may or may not be able to speak for William Shakespeare, part of what 
constitutes man is the capability to look ‘before and after’.  The editors of the Norton 
Shakespeare helpfully explain that ‘looking before and after’ can be read as ‘able to see past 
and future’, but I am not so certain of this Aristotelian interpretation.  Looking, looking and 
searching for something, is not quite the same as seeing something that has been found.  For 
Derrida, what is before can always suggest both what is behind (in the past) and what is in 
front (in the future).  The phrase, ‘it is before us’ can always be anachronistic, untimely.  
Even Aristotle in the Physics admits to a certain indeterminancy of the before: ‘‘before’ is 
used contraiwise with reference to past and to future time; for in the past we call ‘before’ 
what is farther from the ‘now’, and ‘after’ what is nearer, but in the future we call the nearer 
‘before’ and the farther ‘after’ ’ (223a). 
And if we take Shakespeare as an anachronistic, an untimely, reader of time in Aristotle, it 
is perhaps not fortuitous that in the opening of a play where TIME enters, Shakespeare gives 
us an instance of an indeterminate ‘before and after.’  Speaking to Hermione of his childhood 
friendship with Leontes, Polixenes says, 
 
We were, fair Queen, 
Two lads that thought there was no more behind 
But such a day tomorrow as today, 
And to be boy eternal. 
 
At first glance, this passage doesn’t seem to make much sense.  The two boys ‘thought there 
was no more behind / But such a day tomorrow as today.’  How can tomorrow be behind?  
As both the editors of the Riverside and Norton Shakespeare point out, the word behind 
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means to be at the back, at the rear of something, but it in a more archaic usage it also meant 
what was held in reserve, what remained still to come.  The ‘two lads thought that there was 
no more behind [still to come] / But such a day tomorrow as today.’  Enter TIME and we are 
caught in the strange dislocation, the hovering uncertainty of a ‘behind’ that can be at once 
behind us (at the back, in the past) and behind us (in the front, in the future).  Enter TIME, 
and the now doesn’t know whether it is coming or going, whether it has arrived before it has 
left.  As Hamlet says: ‘This bad begins and worse remains behind [still to come]’ 
When TIME arrives in Act Four of The Winter’s Tale, without the possibility of arriving 
as itself, wonder of wonders, TIME speaks.  When time enters and speaks, its syntax is 
strange, and may echo a long tradition of pageantry and festival: of time as destruction; of 
time as the revelation and restitution of the truth; of time with a scythe, wings and hourglass, 
the symbol of rushing, imminent mortality.  But when TIME speaks, when it accounts for its 
own attributes, it claims amongst its first qualities the ability to make and unfold error, to be 
untimely, to be anachronistic: 
 
I that please some, try all; both joy and terror 
Of good and bad; that makes and unfolds error 
 
Like the Sphinx, TIME speaks in riddles.  TIME begins, ‘I that please some, try all.’  I … try 
all.  I examine, I submit to trial, I test the patience of everyone.  I sift, strain and single out 
everyone.  Time singles out everyone: an amazing singular universal that is worthy of 
Aristotle’s definition of time as a divided continuity.  Shakespeare’s understanding of time 
initially seems very close to that of Aristotle.  But TIME then says: I single out everyone and 
‘I please some.’  I give some pleasure, but in the end I catch everyone.  I single out everyone 
and I please some.  What wondrous machine is it that can universally reach every individual 
and, at the same time, can also only touch some, can single out an indeterminate portion, an 
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indefinite number?  Shakespeare alludes to the possibility that there is an aspect of time that 
is unaccountable, that cannot be counted.  This is what the theatre does: it plays with time.  It 
ranges ‘o’er sixteen years … in one self-born hour’. 
For Aristotle, it is indispensable that time can be counted by the now (as the number of the 
movement of the before and after).  The now is the hinge of time.  The objections to 
Aristotle’s association of time with movement are very old.  Responding to Aristotle in the 
third century, Plotinus had asked: ‘is Time the Measure of any and every Movement?  Have 
we any means of calculating disconnected and lawless movement?  What number or measure 
would apply?’  Shakespeare offers what might be called an anachronistic variation on 
Plotinus’s criticisms of Aristotle.  Time may be a unique relation – singular universal, 
divided continuity, the other of being – but this does not necessarily suggest that time can 
always be counted or that the sequence and order of the before and after can be distinguished 
and measured by the now. When it comes to time, there is always a some that is 
incommensurable with the all. 
It is from this incommensurability that TIME also appears indifferent to faith or morality, 
bringing ‘both joy and terror / Of good and bad.’  Time –– rushing imminent mortality –– 
delivers both ‘joy and terror’ to ‘good and bad’ alike.  Time “itself” is neither just nor unjust: 
it is the possibility of justice and injustice.  It is this unsettling time beyond measure (at once 
all and some) and beyond morality (at once just and unjust) ‘that makes and unfolds error’.  
Time both creates and reveals error.  One can easily imagine that the passage of time reveals 
error, but how does time make error?  How does ‘looking before and after’ create error?  
Time makes mistakes, transgressions, flaws and malformations.  Time makes wandering, 
digression and deviation.  Time ‘makes and unfolds error’.  It makes and spreads out, unfurls, 
unwraps everything that is untimely and anachronistic when we are ‘looking before and after’ 
and, arriving before we have departed, only find the ‘wide gap’ of time. 
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Incommensurable, unequal, neither good nor bad and open to the possibility of the loss of 
direction, of the assured orderly sequence of the before and after, the behind and in front, 
TIME in The Winter’s Tale is also, as critics have long pointed out, entirely redundant to the 
plot and narrative.  The information that TIME passes on to the audience – chiefly that 
sixteen years have now elapsed – is immediately repeated at the start of Act Four scene two.  
In other words, Act Four scene one is a detachable scene.  You can put it in, you can take it 
out – and the narrative of the play is unchanged.  The entrance of time is not an integral part 
of the ‘complete whole’, and manifestly fails to follow Aristotle’s criteria for a good play in 
the Poetics. 
This redundant, detachable scene in The Winter’s Tale was described by William Blisset 
as ‘the hinge of the diptych’ and by Frederick Kiefer as ‘the hinge, the joint that puts time 
back in order’.  The entrance of TIME is therefore ‘the central principle, the cardinal or 
critical point, on which everything turns or relies’ and a ‘moveable joint or mechanism by 
which a door is hung on its side post to permit opening and shutting’ (OED).  In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida associates ‘the hinge’ with the oscillation of space becoming time 
and time becoming space that challenges the traditional concept of time which conserves ‘its 
homogeneity and its fundamental successivity by demonstrating … that the past present and 
future present constitute originarily, by dividing it, the form of the living present’.  In other 
words, the before and after do not work for the now.  The now is not, as Aristotle argues, the 
measure of the before and after.  For us, time moves, time changes and we have no 
guarantee, no assurance that time “itself” does not move, does not also change.  Derrida 
returns in Spectres of Marx (1993) to the hinge in his extended reading of Hamlet’s lament: 
‘The time is out of joint.  O cursèd spite / That ever I was born to set it right!’  The entrance 
of TIME in The Winter’s Tale can be seen as a remarkable personification or representation 
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of that which is out of joint, of that which comes off its hinges, of that which always leaves 
us with a ‘disjointed or disadjusted now’. 
Aristotle before Homer.  If we accept that Shakespeare knew what he was doing in Troilus 
and Cressida and that he was playing anachronistically with Aristotelian time, we could see 
the beginning of Act Four of The Winter’s Tale as an audacious and unprecedented disjointed 
hinge, as a ‘movable joint’ that permits not only the ‘opening and shutting’ of the sixteen 
year gap between Act Three and Act Four, but also allows at least for the possibility of 
playing with the assured sequence of the before and after and the behind and in front.  Enter 
TIME and there is no longer a fixed and certain order for the events in Sicily and Bohemia.    
Aristotle before Homer?  Bohemia before Sicily?  Enter TIME, the ‘movable joint’, and 
The Winter’s Tale could begin with either Act One or Act Four.  This may not be so 
improbable and audacious as it sounds, and might even account for the strange echoes in 
these two openings:   
Act One scene one.  Archidamus and Camillo speak of the imminent visit of Leontes.  
Though separated for many years, they have remained in contact and ‘have seemed to be 
together, though absent’.  The two men talk of the King’s son, Prince Mamillius, ‘a 
gentleman of the greatest promise’.  Act One scene two.  Polixenes has been visiting his 
brother for nine months and, anxious about what may ‘breed upon our absence’, wishes to 
return to Bohemia.  First Leontes and then Hermione try to persuade him to stay and he 
relents.  Leontes then reveals that he has adopted a disguise to hide his jealously; a disguise 
that he will not be able to keep.  Leontes then tries to convince Camillo to poison Polixenes, 
and the scene ends with Camillo and Polixenes leaving for Bohemia … 
Act Four scene two. ‘Enter Polixenes and Camillo.’  It is sixteen years since Camillo has 
left Sicily and he now wishes to return.  Polixenes pleads with him to stay and to not go back 
to Leontes, whose actions have led to the exile of Camillo and the ‘loss of his most precious 
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queen and children’.  The two men talk of Polixenes’s wayward son, Prince Florizel, whose 
absence from the court has been ‘missingly noted’ by his father.  The Prince spends most of 
his time at the house of an unaccountably wealthy shepherd who has a beautiful daughter ‘of 
most rare note’.  Polixenes’s persuades Camillo to put aside his thoughts of going to Sicily 
and to visit in disguise the shepherd’s house … 
One could almost stage these opening scenes of Act Four and Act One concurrently, in the 
style of Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia or The Coasts of Utopia with a revolving stage shifting 
back and forth, before and after: Camillo in Bohemia thinking of returning to Sicily; 
Polixenes in Sicily thinking of returning to Bohemia.  Both kings adopting disguises; both 
kings (who have ostensibly overcome the absence between them) unable to respond to the 
real or imaginary absence (the betrayal) of those that they love most; both kings who, as 
children ‘thought that there was no more behind / But such a day tomorrow as today’, as 
adults can make no sense, no order, of what comes behind and in front of them, before and 
after them. 
Enter TIME and Shakespeare is hinting at an unthinkable theatre to come where the 
unities of time, action and place are unhinged.  Sicily before Bohemia.  Is such an 
anachronism possible?   
The play begins with Camillo thinking of his sixteen-year absence from Sicily and his 
going with Polixenes to spy on Florizel and Perdita.  Polixenes then forbids the marriage of 
his son to the shepherd’s daughter and Camillo returns to Sicily with the young lovers.  Off 
stage, Leontes discovers Perdita as his lost daughter and Polixenes blesses the wedding of the 
young prince and princess.  On stage, the statue of the seemingly dead Hermione is revealed.  
It is a statue that has been aged sixteen years, a statue that appears to take account of the 
‘wide gap’ of time.  It is statue that moves, a living Queen that endures and overcomes the 
‘wide gap’ of time.   
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And then, playing with Aristotle, Shakespeare’s great and terrible insight: Enter TIME on 
the stage and the future of the past is always somehow still to come.  Camillo finds himself 
talking to Archidamus about the king’s planned visit to Bohemia.  At the prompting of 
Leontes, Hermione pleads with Polixenes to stay a little longer in Sicily.  Polixenes and 
Camillo leave in fear of their lives.  Hermione is imprisoned and her newborn baby is taken 
away from her.  Hermione is tried and collapses at the court.  Her death is announced and the 
play ends with the first sight of Bohemia.  Antigonus leaves the baby exposed to the elements 
and exits, ‘pursued by a bear.’  An old shepherd and a clown find a baby …  
 
Enter TIME, the Chorus. 
I that please some, try all; both joy and terror 
Of good and bad; that makes and unfolds error 
Now take upon me in the name of Time 
To use my wings.  Impute it not a crime 
To me or my swift passage that I slide 
O’er sixteen years and leave the growth untried 
Of that wide gap, since it is in my power 
To o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour 
To plant and ‘o’erwhelm custom. 
 
 
